We’re in an exciting time for users who want to take back control from major platforms like Twitter and Facebook. However, this new environment comes with challenges and risks for user privacy, so we need to get it right and make sure networks like the Fediverse and Bluesky are mindful of past...

Synopsis: The article discusses the FBI’s seizure of the Mastodon server and emphasizes the need for privacy protection in decentralized platforms like the Fediverse. It calls for hosts to implement basic security measures, adopt policies to protect users, and notify them of law enforcement actions. Users are encouraged to evaluate server precautions and voice concerns. Developers should prioritize end-to-end encryption for direct messages. Overall, the Fediverse community must prioritize user privacy and security to create a safer environment for all.

Summary:

Introduction

  • We are in an exciting time for users wanting to regain control from major platforms like Twitter and Facebook.
  • However, decentralized platforms like the Fediverse and Bluesky must be mindful of user privacy challenges and risks.
  • Last May, the Mastodon server Kolektiva.social was compromised when the FBI seized all electronics, including a backup of the instance database, during an unrelated raid on one of the server’s admins.
  • This incident serves as a reminder to protect user privacy on decentralized platforms.

A Fediverse Wake-up Call

  • The story of equipment seizure echoes past digital rights cases like Steve Jackson Games v. Secret Service, emphasizing the need for more focused seizures.
  • Law enforcement must improve its approach to seizing equipment and should only do so when relevant to an investigation.
  • Decentralized web hosts need to have their users’ backs and protect their privacy.

Why Protecting the Fediverse Matters

  • The Fediverse serves marginalized communities targeted by law enforcement, making user privacy protection crucial.
  • The FBI’s seizure of Kolektiva’s database compromised personal information, posts, and interactions from thousands of users, affecting other instances as well.
  • Users’ data collected by the government can be used for unrelated investigations, highlighting the importance of strong privacy measures.

What is a decentralized server host to do?

  • Basic security practices, such as firewalls and limited user access, should be implemented for servers exposed to the internet.
  • Limit data collection and storage to what is necessary and stay informed about security threats in the platform’s code.
  • Adopt policies and practices to protect users, including transparency reports about law enforcement attempts and notification to users about any access to their information.

What can users do?

  • Evaluate a server’s precautions before joining the Fediverse and raise privacy concerns with admins and users on the instance.
  • Encourage servers to include privacy commitments in their terms of service to resist law enforcement demands.
  • Users have the freedom to move to another instance if they are dissatisfied with the privacy measures.

What can developers do?

  • Implement end-to-end encryption of direct messages to protect sensitive content.
  • The Kolektiva raid highlights the need for all decentralized content hosts to prioritize privacy and follow EFF’s recommendations.

Conclusion

  • Decentralized platforms offer opportunities for user control, but user privacy protection is vital.
  • Hosts, users, and developers must work together to build a more secure and privacy-focused Fediverse.
  • HiddenLayer5@lemmy.mlEnglish
    223·
    1 year ago

    If you federate with other instances they have a copy of your public facing account data. That’s how ActivityPub works and it’s very far from ideal.

    • HughJanus@lemmy.mlEnglish
      171·
      1 year ago

      LOL no public social media can function without “public facing account data”. I’m not not worried about that. I’m worried about things like IP address, login info, account metadata, etc

    • loutr@sh.itjust.worksEnglish
      171·
      1 year ago

      But if it’s public law enforcement agencies can just browse/scrape the website to collect the data, or am I missing something?

      • HiddenLayer5@lemmy.mlEnglish
        81·
        1 year ago

        The only actual confidential data stored off instance that I can think of is DMs, if you message someone on another instance (which is why you shouldn’t use DMs for any sensitive communication unless they’re e2ee).

        The other major issue is whether they delete your data when you delete it from your home instance, or if you edit your post, whether they update their version in a timely manner. ActivityPub sends edits and deletion signals to federated instances, but if they have since defederated without purging your instance’s data or is keeping backups, then they could well have posts you think you deleted or display a version of your post that’s out of date (you should assume all versions of an edited post are kept, some platforms keep them all by design presumably to try and mitigate edit-trolling).

      • krakenx@lemmy.worldEnglish
        41·
        1 year ago

        Things like PMs, your subscription lists,and upvote/downvotes aren’t possible (or are difficult?) to scrape, but are shared across federated instances. Those things were considered private on Reddit, so a lot of folks might assume they are also private on Lemmy.