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Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: July 4th, 2023

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  • JATth@lemmy.worldtoTechnology@lemmy.world*Permanently Deleted*
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    2 months ago

    So, now they are slowly (or immediately and forever, I don’t know the time span) injecting propaganda into their clone of wikipedia and they are simultaneously thus admitting they are doing it. (to further brainwash the russian citizens)

    So lettme repeat: FUCK PUTIN, and stuff your rubber clones in your ass. (which there are many of)


  • JATth@lemmy.worldtoTechnology@lemmy.worldUnsmart a smart TV
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    3 months ago

    The in-rush of endorphins when the modded LCD thing actually worked probably knocked you out?

    A bit of a side story: I disassemble probably 1–5 panels in a week. (For recycling, it takes about 20-45min per panel.) The flat cables alone are so flimsy, I would say just assembling a display again from known, matched and functional parts would take days. I would triple or quadruple that to assemble a display from random parts. Considering this, that modded panel is quite amazing to me.

    In standalone panels, the PSU has a chance of killing you: the main capacitors can hold multiple joules worth of nope, charged to about 400v. So, if the main caps are not allowed to discharge (if they discharge at all that is), there is a possibility of death when disassembling a panel with an integrated PSU. Waiting “5min” is bad; a PSU needs to be unplugged for a day or two at least before the charge drains out.


  • I put too way too much effort in this reply… Yes… it’s nerve racking, especially if you are resorting to BIOS flashback to boot the CPU on an older (new) board.

    Can’t get visuals (except maybe leds/indicators on the motherboard itself) when your CPU is incapable of accessing the ram or the devices yet. All external devices normally communicate through the RAM. (And by external, I mean not on the CPU package) Yet, the CPU has to solve out this chicken-and-egg problem of how to progress from the cold-boot without knowing what external RAM is installed. There are plethora of timing/clock-cycle/voltage settings for one stick of ram, which are tested on POST. Establishing sane DDR5/4 parameters is non-trivial. (I think it is order of +20!, twenty factorial: 2432902008176640000, if there were no starting point of XMP, JEDEC etc.)

    I use hand tuned settings for DDR4, and on cold boot, the BIOS adjust the settings which I didn’t forbid it to do. Unless I unplug the PSU from the wall, the BIOS won’t retrain the memory again. I suspect my settings still aren’t 100% stable. (over period of years) Non-cold-boot assumes the ram works 100% same on each power up. If some OC setting drifts past a threshold once the system is heat soaked or receives more EMI interference, this could provoke a crash/BSOD etc. in absurd theory having a busy wifi router next the ram could cause the bios to select more robust/conservative settings to counter the EMI interference. Would be fun to know, if this would be true.


  • I would highly recommend Curve25519, etc., just because such keys are faster and less common than RSA public-private keys in today’s world. RSA 2048-bit keys are considered weak today, while the Curve25519 256-bit keys remain stronger. Also, the ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher has an interesting backstory and doesn’t necessarily need hardware acceleration (which, in theory, could be borked by the HW-vendor) to obtain good performance.

    Unfortunately, some SSH front-ends don’t play nice with Curve25519 public-private keys yet… (I’m pointing at the putty SSH client, but that may have improved from the last time I had to use it)








  • The attack is spread via iMessage. A vulnerable device merely needs to receive a bad message with PDF attachment. --> A Remote code execution. No user interaction.

    Yikes. Indeed.

    The attack entry point is via bad TrueType font + PDF attachment that only needs to processed once. Once a process touches that, the attack vector begins and exploits are chained until they get kernel mode access. After getting kernel mode access all hope is lost, the attacker owns the device.

    Only sliver of hope is that fixing the attack entry point blocks the current attack. And that bug is:

    This attachment exploits the remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2023-41990 in the undocumented, Apple-only ADJUST TrueType font instruction. This instruction had existed since the early nineties before a patch removed it.

    But unless all the CVEs are patched, it is just matter of time a new attack entry point is found.


  • Shorter version: Operating systems set up hardware locks and protections to confine processes, and once set up, they cannot be undone. (the hardware + OS denies modifications to the security policy)

    • Attacker broke out from the app sandbox. (attacker can run code in the infected process)
    • Broke out of the process. (gained root access; attacker can run anything)
    • Broke into the kernel space (gained 100% control over the hardware)
    • Corrupted some kernel memory via a damm magic MMIO accesses nobody knows (hardware vulnerable)
    • Bypassed protections that kernel set up earlier such that it cannot accidentally modify itself.
    • Finally broke the kernel via hardware exploit thus the attacker got rootkit level access.

    Getting arbitrary code execution and root access is one thing, but breaking out from the damm kernel configured hardware protections is insane.

    They basically managed to flip a “read-only” switch to “modify-as-much-as-you-like”. The infected device at this point is broken beyond repair, as the firmware(s) may have been tampered with. End result is a terrestrial spy brick.